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Abstract
This paper reports an experimental study on three well-known solu-
tions for problems of adjudicating conicting claims: the constrained
equal-awards, the proportional, and the constrained equal-losses rules.
We rst let subjects play three games designed such that the unique
equilibrium allocation coincides with the recommendation of one of
these three rules. In addition, we let subjects play an additional game,
that has the property that all (and only) strategy proles in which
players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilib-
rium. While in the rst three games subjectsplay easily converges
to the unique equilibrium rule, in the last game the proportional rule
overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device, especially when we
frame the game with an hypothetical bankruptcy situation. We also
administered a questionnaire to a di¤erent group of students, asking
them to act as impartial arbitrators to solve (among others) the same
problems played in the lab. Also in this case, respondents were sen-
sitive to the framing of the questions, but the proportional rule was
selected by the vast majority of respondents.
JEL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER: C91, D63, D74
KEYWORDS: Claims problems, Proportional rule, Experimental Eco-
nomics
1 Introduction
When a rm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidation value be divided
among its creditors? If a person dies and the debts left behind are found to
exceed the worth of her estate, how should the estate be divided? If a certain
amount of money should be collected from a population, how much should
each individual contribute? How should medical triage be designed, when
the available resources are not su¢ cient to cover individual needs? These
questions are examples of the so-called problems of adjudicating conicting
claims. There is an extensive literature (see Herrero and Villar (2001),
Moulin (2002) or Thomson (2003) for recent surveys) dealing with the formal
analysis of these problems following ONeills (1982) seminal contribution.
The objective of this literature is to identify well-behaved rulesto x, for
each problem, the appropriate division among the claimants of the available
amount.
Three are the rules that emerge from this literature. The proportional
rule, which chooses awards proportional to claims, is inspired in Aristotles
Maxim (Equals should be treated equally, and unequals, unequally in pro-
portion to relevant similarities and di¤erences), probably the oldest formal
principle of distributive justice. Two other rules, that can be traced back
to Maimonides, are the so-called constrained equal awards and constrained
equal losses. The former distributes the available amount equally, provided
no agent ends up with more than she claims; the latter rule imposes equal
losses for all the agents with one proviso: no one should obtain a negative
amount. Besides their long tradition, these three rules are the most common
methods employed for solving practical problems.1 Furthermore, they are
the only ones that satisfy the four basic invariance axioms within the family
of rules that treat equal claims equally (e.g., Moulin, 2000). On the other
hand, no compelling theoretical argument has been found so far to select,
among these rules (or other alternatives) a unique optimal solution to adju-
dicate conicting claims. On the contrary, theory (and standard practice)
appeal to one or another depending on the economic context at stake.
The aim of this paper is to bring this interesting theoretical debate into
1The proportional rule is generally employed to ration shareholders in bankruptcy
regulations (e.g., Hart, 1999; Kaminski, 2006). The constrained equal awards rule makes
good sense, for instance, in problems of estate division (e.g., Aumann and Maschler, 1985).
The constrained equal losses rule is appealing in the case of tax schemes, as it looks for the
most egalitarian after-tax income distribution. It is also a natural procedure for cases in
which claims are related to needs, as in the case of public support of health care expenses
(e.g., Cuadras-Morató et al., 2001).
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an experimental lab. Our main question here can be summarized as follows:
Is there any particular rule that is salient in subjectsperception of the
optimal solution to a problem of adjudicating conicting claims?
To answer this question, two lines of research are open. One, which is
very much in line with the axiomatic approach, is to put subjects in front
of hypothetical problems and ask them to solve them from the point of
view of an outside observer ; the other is to fully exploit the experimental
methodology and provide subjects with an active role to solve the claim
problem. This is to say, to design hypothetical situations in which they are
actual claimants rather than mere outside observers. The results of such
an experiment may provide experimental evidence on how agents play when
they are personally involved in real conicting claim problems.
The experimental methodology we just mentioned is more in line with the
so-called non-cooperative approach to conicting claim problems (e.g., Chun,
1989; Dagan et al., 1997). This approach applies to these problems the same
methodology known as the Nash program for the theory of bargaining, by
which specic procedures are constructed as non-cooperative games with
the property that the unique equilibrium allocation corresponds to the one
dictated by a specic rule (e.g., Nash, 1953; Binmore et al., 1992; Roemer,
1996). In other words, this approach provides theoretical support to certain
rules by constructing specic strategic situations, for which such rules are
self-enforcing.
In this paper we examine both lines of research and the results we obtain
should be considered as complementary. We rst selected 144 students to
play in the lab a sequence of games corresponding to three (non-cooperative)
procedures proposed by the literature. These procedures share the same
game-form and display very similar strategic properties: there is always a
player with a weakly dominant strategy (that corresponds to each of the
three rules we are considering) by which she can force an outcome of the
game in her favor. Thus, if subjects recognize the strategic incentives in-
duced by each game, the choice of a particular procedure may be equivalent
to the choice of a particular rule to solve the problem.
We then consider an additional procedure, (a simple majority game),
which has the property that all (and only those) strategy proles in which
all players coordinate on the same rule constitute a strict Nash equilibrium.
This additional game has no selection incentives, but coordination incentives
only. Thus, we used this game to investigate more compellingly the rule
selection issue.
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Since the specic contexts are so important in all practical cases of ad-
judicating claims, we also checked whether subjects participating in games
with such strong strategic properties would be sensitive to framing e¤ects.
To this purpose, in some sessions we explained to subjects each procedure
with a di¤erent story, somehow consistent with the rule supported by
the procedure, and compared the results with the evidence of some (con-
trol) sessions in which the same procedures were played under a completely
unframedscenario, in which only monetary payo¤s associated to strategy
proles were provided. We did so to see whether a frame may have induced
subjects to behave di¤erently.
The main ndings of this experiment can be summarized as follows.
While in the rst three procedures subjects play easily converges to the
unique equilibrium rule even in the rst rounds, in the majority procedure
the proportional rule overwhelmingly prevails as a coordination device. As
for the framing issue, we nd that frames a¤ect subjects behavior only
in the majority procedure. By contrast, for the other procedures, strategic
considerations appear to be too compelling to render framing e¤ects relevant.
The alternative approach consisted of selecting a di¤erent group of 164
students, administering them a questionnaire in which they were asked to
choose their preferred rule from the viewpoint of an arbitrator in charge
of resolving, among others, the same problem played out previously in the
lab by the other group of subjects. Consistently with our experimental
ndings, the proportional solution prevailed as the modal choice for 90%
of the respondents. Nonetheless, they also proved to be sensitive to the
particular situation at hand, meaning that framing e¤ects do also occur
here.
Despite the extensive experimental literature on related issues such as
bargaining (see, for instance, Ochs and Roth (1989), and the literature cited
therein), or arbitration (see, for instance, Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984),
Ashenfelter et al., (1992), and the literature cited therein), this is, to the
best of our knowledge, the rst experiment on problems of adjudicating
conicting claims. The closest reference to our work is Gatcher and Riedls
(2004) experimental paper. In their independently conducted work, they
also combine surveys and standard laboratory experiments. However, dif-
ferently to ours, in their experiment subjects did not follow any specied
protocol, but had to negotiate an agreement in a symmetric free-form bar-
gaining.2 As for the comparison with our ndings, their questionnaire leads
2Also in the questionnaire, subjects were not constrained in their choice by the three
rules object of this paper, but they could allocate the available amount between the two
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to results quite similar to ours (i.e., the proportional rule prevails), while
in the experiment, nal agreements were closer to the solution proposed by
the constrained equal awards rule.3
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we set
up the model, while in Section 3, we present the design of the experiment.
In Section 4, we report on our experimental results, whereas in Section 5, we
report on the results of the questionnaire. Our conclusions, comments and
further proposals are then presented in Section 6, followed by an Appendix
containing the proofs of some theoretical results related to our study and
the instructions for the experiment and the questionnaire.
2 The model
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a set of agents with generic elements i and j.
A problem of adjudicating conicting claims is a pair (c; E), where E > 0
represents the amount to divide, and c 2 Rn+ is a vector of claims whose ith
component is ci; with
P
i2N ci > E. In words, ci is the claim of agent i on
a certain amount (the estate) E. We denote by B the family of all those
problems. We assume, without loss of generality, that agents are ordered by
claims, so that c1  c2  :::  cn:4
A rule is a mapping r : B ! Rn that associates a unique allocation
r(c; E) with every problem (c; E) such that:
(i) 0  r(c; E)  c.
(ii)
P
i2N ri(c; E) = E.
(iii) For all i; j 2 N , if ci  cj then ri(c; E)  rj(c; E) and ci ri(c; E) 
cj   rj(c; E).
The allocation r(c; E) is interpreted as a desirable way of dividing E
among the agents in N . Requirement (i) is that each agent receives an
award that is non-negative and bounded above by her claim. Requirement
hypothetical claimants any way they wanted. In addition, they only deal with 2-player
problems.
3Another related work is that of Cuadras-Morató et al . (2001). They investigate, by
way of questionnaires, the equity properties of di¤erent rules in the context of health care
problems. In this regard, they nd that when asked to choose from among six potential
allocations, (including the solution proposed by the proportional and the constrained equal
losses rules), using the perspective of an impartial judge in the context of health care
problems, subjects displayed a slight preference for the constrained equal losses rule. See
also the papers of Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and Frolich et al . (1987), in which di¤erent
bargaining solutions are also investigated by means of questionnaires.
4 In the remainder of the paper, we shall refer to agent 1 (n), that is, the agent with
the highest (lowest) claim, as the highest (lowest) claimant.
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(ii) is that the entire amount must be allocated. Finally, requirement (iii) is
that agents with higher claims receive higher awards and face higher losses.5
We denote the set of all such rules by R.
We then introduce the three rules object of our study. The constrained
equal awards rule makes awards as equal as possible, subject to no agent
receiving more than her claim. The proportional rule distributes awards
proportionally to claims. The constrained equal losses rule makes losses as
equal as possible, subject to the condition that no agent ends up with a
negative award.
The constrained equal awards rule, cea, selects for all (c; E) 2 B, the
vector (minfci; g)i2N , where  > 0 is chosen so that
P
i2N minfci; g = E
.
The proportional rule, p, selects for all (c; E) 2 B, the vector c, where 
is chosen so that
P
i2N ci = E:
The constrained equal losses rule, cel, selects for all (c; E) 2 B, the vector
(maxf0; ci g)i2N , where  > 0 is chosen so that
P
i2N maxf0; ci g = E.
Remark 1 Note that for all (c; E) 2 B and all r 2 R, cel1(c; E)  r1(c; E)
and cean(c; E)  rn(c; E). In other words, cel ( cea) is the rule preferred by
the highest (lowest) claimant from among all of the rules belonging to R.
We now present three noncooperative procedures proposed to solve claim
problems.
In the diminishing claims procedure, if agents do not agree on a particular
rule, then their claims are reduced by substituting them with the highest
amount assigned to every agent by the chosen rules. Agentsrules are then
applied to the resulting problem after claims have been adjusted. If the
chosen rules coincide in their allocation to the new problem, the procedure
stops. Otherwise, claims are reduced again, and if the process does not
converge in a nite number of steps, the limit of the resulting claims vectors
(if it exists) is chosen as solution to the problem. Otherwise, nobody gets
anything. Formally,
5While conditions (i) and (ii) are standard in the denition of a rule, requirement (iii)
is considered in the literature as an independent axiom called order preservation, and any
rule satisfying condition (iii) is said to belong to the set of order-preserving rules. Since all
of the rules stipulated for our experiment satisfy condition (iii), we shall abuse standard
terminology by referring to order-preserving rules as simply rules.
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The diminishing claims procedure (P1) [Chun (1989)]. Let (c; E) 2 B
be given. Each player i 2 N chooses a rule ri 2 R, with r i denoting the
strategy prole selected by is opponents. Let r =

ri; r i
	
be the prole
of the reported rules. The division proposed by the diminishing claims
procedure, dc[r; (c; E)] is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c: For all i 2 N; calculate ri(c1; E): If ri(c1; E) =
rj(c1; E); for all i; j 2 N , then dc[r; (c; E)] = ri(c1; E). Otherwise, move on
the next step.
Step 2. For all i 2 N , let c2i = maxj2N
n
rji (c
1; E)
o
. For all j 2 N; cal-
culate rj(c2; E). If ri(c2; E) = rj(c2; E); for all i; j 2 N , then dc[r; (c; E)] =
ri(c2; E). Otherwise, move on the next step.
Step k+1. For all i 2 N , let ck+1i = maxj2N
n
rji (c
k; E)
o
. For all j 2 N;
calculate rj(ck+1; E) . If rj(ck+1; E) = ri(ck+1; E); for all i; j 2 N , then
dc[r; (c; E)] = ri(ck+1; E). Otherwise, move on the next step.
If the previous process does not end in a nite number of steps, then:
Limit case. Compute limt!1 ct: If it converges to an allocation x such
that
P
i2N x

i  E; then x = dc[r; (c; E)]. Otherwise, dc[r; (c; E)] = 0:
In the proportional concessions procedure, if agents do not agree on the
proposed rule, then they receive the proportional share of half of the estate.
Agentsrules are then applied to divide the remainder after adjusting claims.
If the chosen rules coincide in their allocation to the new problem, then the
procedure stops. Otherwise, the process starts all over again. If it does
not converge within a nite number of steps, the limit of the aggregation of
concessions (if it exists) is then chosen as solution to the problem. Otherwise,
nobody gets anything. Formally,
The proportional concessions procedure (P2) [Moreno-Ternero (2002)].
Let (c; E) 2 B be given. Each player i 2 N chooses a rule ri 2 R, with r i
denoting the strategy prole selected by is opponents. Let r =

ri; r i
	
be the prole of rules reported. The division proposed by the proportional
concessions procedure, pc[r; (c; E)], is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c and E1 = E. For all i 2 N; calculate ri(c1; E1):
If ri(c1; E1) = rj(c1; E1); for all i; j 2 N; then pc[r; (c; E)] = ri(c1; E1).
Otherwise, move on the next step.
Step 2. For all i 2 N , let m1i = pi(c1; E
1
2 ), c
2 = c1  m1, where m1 =
(m1i )i2N , and E
2 = E1  Pm1i = E2 . For all i 2 N , calculate ri(c2; E2): If
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ri(c2; E2) = rj(c2; E2); for all i; j 2 N; then pc[r(c; E)] = m1 + ri(c2; E2):
Otherwise, move on the next step.
Step k+1. For all i 2 N , let mki = pi(ck; E
k
2 ), c
k+1 = ck   mk, and
Ek+1 = Ek   Pmki = E2k . For all i 2 N , calculate ri(ck+1; Ek+1). If
ri(ck+1; Ek+1) = rj(ck+1; Ek+1); for all i; j 2 N , then pc[r; (c; E)] = m1 +
  +mk + ri(ck+1; Ek+1). Otherwise, move on the next step.
If the previous process does not end in a nite number of steps, then:
Limit case. Compute limk!1(m1 +    + mk). If it converges to an
allocation x such that
P
i2N x

i  E; then x = pc[r; (c; E)]. Otherwise,
pc[r; (c; E)] = 0.
In the unanimous concessions procedure, if agents do not agree on the
rule proposed, they receive the minimum amount assigned by the chosen
rules. Agentsrules are then applied to the residual problem, after adjusting
claims and the liquidation value. If the chosen rules agree on the allocation
for the new problem, then the procedure stops. Otherwise, the process starts
all over again. If it does not end in a nite number of steps, the limit of
the aggregation of minimal concessions (if it exists) is then chosen as the
solution to the problem. Otherwise, nobody gets anything. Formally,
The unanimous concessions procedure (P3) [Herrero (2003)]. Let (c; E) 2
B be given. Each player i 2 N chooses a rule ri 2 R, with r i denoting
the strategy prole selected by is opponents. Let r =

ri; r i
	
be the pro-
le of rules reported. The division proposed by the unanimous concessions
procedure, u[r; (c; E)] is obtained as follows:
Step 1. Let c1 = c and E1 = E. For all j 2 N; calculate rj(c1; E1):
If ri(c1; E1) = rj(c1; E1); for all i; j 2 N , then u[r; (c; E)] = ri(c1; E1).
Otherwise, move on the next step.
Step 2. For all i 2 N , let m1i = minj2N
n
rji (c
1; E1)
o
, E2 = E1  P
i2N m
1
i , and c
2 = c1  m1, where m1 = (m1i )i2N . For all i 2 N; calculate
ri(c2; E2). If ri(c2; E2) = rj(c2; E2); for all i; j 2 N , then u[r; (c; E)] =
m1 + ri(c2; E2). Otherwise, move on the next step.
Step k+1. For all i 2 N , let mki = minj2N
n
rji (c
k; Ek)
o
, Ek+1 = Ek  P
i2N m
k
i , and c
k+1 = ck  mk. For all i 2 N; calculate ri(ck+1; Ek+1): If
ri(ck+1; Ek+1) = rj(ck+1; Ek+1); for all i; j 2 N , then u[r; (c; E)] = m1 +
  +mk + ri(ck+1; Ek+1). Otherwise, move on the next step.
If the previous process does not end in a nite number of steps, then
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Limit case. Compute limk!1(m1 +    + mk). If it converges to an
allocation x such that
P
i2N x

i  E; then x = u[r; (c; E)]. Otherwise,
u[r; (c; E)] = 0.
The strategic properties of these procedures have already been explored
in the literature, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 1 (Chun, 1989; Moreno-Ternero, 2002; Herrero, 2003) The
following statements hold:
(i) If, for some i 2 N; ri = cea, then dc[r; (c; E)] = cea(c; E). Further-
more, in game P1; cea is a weakly dominant strategy for the lowest claimant
and all Nash equilibria are outcome equivalent to cea.
(ii) If, for some i 2 N , ri = p, then pc[r; (c; E)] = p(c; E). Furthermore,
in game P2; if there exists an agent whose preferred allocation is p, then p
is a weakly dominant strategy for her. Finally, all Nash equilibria of P2 are
outcome equivalent to p:
(iii) If, for some i 2 N , ri = cel, then u[r; (c; E)] = cel(c; E). Further-
more, in game P3; cel is a weakly dominant strategy for the highest claimant
and all Nash equilibria of P3 are outcome equivalent to cel.
The basic message of Lemma 1 is that the three procedures selected do
not seem to a¤ord the agents any freedom of choice, at least under very mild
(rst-order) rationality conditions. This is so because there is always some
player (the identity of whom depends on the procedure) who can force the
outcome in her favor by selecting her weakly dominant strategy. This may
render these procedures inadequate if we were genuinely interested in the
rule selection problem, that is, in collecting experimental evidence on how
subjects reach an agreement in the lab. This is why we also consider an
additional procedure which takes the form of a coordination game, which
we call the majority procedure P0:
In P0, a claimant obtains the share of the liquidation value proposed
by her chosen rule only if it has been selected by a single majority (that
is, all other rules have been chosen by a strictly smaller number of agents).
Otherwise, she is ned by " > 0: More precisely:
Majority procedure (P0). Let (c; E) 2 B be given. Each player i 2 N
chooses simultaneously a rule ri 2 R, with r i denoting the strategy prole
selected by is opponents. The payo¤ function is as follows:
i
 
ri; r i

=

rii (c; E) if r
i is the rule selected by a simple majority;
 " otherwise.
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The strategic properties of this procedure are contained in the following
lemma, the (trivial) proof of which is omitted here.
Lemma 2 The set of strict Nash equilibria of P0 is f(r; r; :::; r) : r 2 Rg.
3 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe in detail the main design features of our exper-
imental study.
3.1 Subjects
Our study was conducted in 12 experimental sessions in July 2001, May
2003 and May 2005. A total of 144 students (12 students per session, each
session containing 4 groups of 3 subjects playing) were recruited among the
undergraduate population at the University of Alicante, mainly Economics
students with no (or very little) prior exposure to game theory.
3.2 Frames
In the rst six sessions the problem was framed in three di¤erent ways,
depending on the procedure being employed. The idea was to provide a
framework consistent with the (equilibrium) rule induced by the procedure.
All frames had the common feature that the problem was presented by
the hypothetical situation of a bank going bankrupt.
 Frame 1: Depositors (P1). Within this framework, the claimants
are all bank depositors. In such a case, common-sense (and common
practice) gives priority to the smaller claims (i.e., the smaller deposits),
as it occurs (in equilibrium) with procedure P1:
 Frame 2: Shareholders (P2). Within this framework, the claimants
are all shareholders of the bank. This is the typical situation in which,
in case of a bankruptcy, each shareholder usually obtains a share of
the liquidation value that is proportional to the number of shares of
the banks stock she holds, as occurs (in equilibrium) with procedure
P2.
 Frame 3: Non-governmental organizations (P3). Our last frame-
work is focused on non-governmental organizations sponsored by the
bank. In such a case, we assumed that each claimant had signed a
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contract with the bank, before its bankruptcy, according to which she
will receive a contribution that is in accordance with its social rele-
vance (i.e., the higher the social relevance, the higher the contribution).
Within such a framework, it would seem appropriate to give priority
to higher claimants, as it occurs (in equilibrium) with procedure P3.
 Frame 0: No frame. We also run six unframed sessions. In this case,
subjects were only provided with the payo¤ tables and were required
to play the four games without any story behind.
3.3 Treatments
The 12 sessions were run in a computer lab.6 In the rst 6 sessions, subjects
were randomly assigned to groups of 3 individuals each and played twenty
rounds of a framed procedure, P1, P2 or P3, followed by twenty rounds of
P0 presented under the same frame. In the last 6 sessions, subjects played
twenty rounds of each of the four procedures, P1, P2, P3 and P0, without any
framework. Table 1 reports on the precise sequence of procedures played in
the 12 sessions.
treat 1 treat 2 treat 3 treat 4 treat 5 treat 6
ses1 ses2 ses3 ses4 ses5 ses6 ses7 ses8 ses9 ses10 ses11 ses12
P1 P1 P2 P2 P3 P3 P1 P1 P3 P3 P2 P2
P0 P0 P0 P0 P0 P0 P2 P2 P2 P2 P1 P1
P3 P3 P1 P1 P3 P3
P0 P0 P0 P0 P0 P0
framed unframed
(1)
Table 1: Sequential structure of the experimental sessions
As Table 1 shows, all (un)framed treatments consist of a sequence of (four)
two procedures. The framed sessions lasted for approximately 45, whereas
the unframed ones lasted about 70. In all sessions, subjects played anony-
mously in groups of three players with randomly matched opponents. Sub-
jects were informed that their player position (i.e., their individual claims
6The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 1999).
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in the problem) would remain constant throughout the session, while the
composition of their group would change at every round.
Instructions were provided by a self-paced, interactive computer program
that introduced and described the experiment. Subjects were also given a
written copy of the instructions (identical to those that appeared on the
screen), and of the payo¤ table associated with the procedure being played.7
At the end of each round, subjects were informed about the outcome of the
game and the monetary payo¤ associated with it.
3.4 The claim problem
As we mentioned earlier, all four procedures were constructed upon the same
problem (c; E), where c = (49; 46; 5) (i.e.,
P
ci = 100) and E = 20:8
The resulting allocations associated with each rule for this specic problem
are as follows:
cea(c; E) = (7:5; 7:5; 5);
p(c; E) = (9:8; 9:2; 1);
cel(c; E) = (11:5; 8:5; 0):
Since, in all of the sessions, subjects played more than one procedure in
sequence, we decided to focus on a single problem to reduce the variability in
the environment and facilitate subjectsunderstanding of the strategic sit-
uation in which they were involved. The main motivation for the choice of
the particular problem (c; E) was to provide each claimant with a strictly
preferred allocation associated with one of the three rules. We already know,
from Remark 1, that, for all rules belonging to R, cel (cea) is the most pre-
ferred rule of the highest (lowest) claimant, independently of the particular
problem at hand. However, this does not guarantee that p will be the most
preferred rule for any middle claimant, unless we imposed some conditions
that are formally presented in the Appendix.
3.5 Game-forms and payo¤s
As we mentioned earlier, all procedures share the same game-form. In each
session, each player was assigned to a player position, corresponding to a
particular claim in the problem (c; E), with ci denoting player is claim.
In each round, each player was required to choose simultaneously a rule
7 Instructions were presented in Spanish language. The complete set of instructions,
translated into English, can be seen in the Appendix.
8All monetary payo¤s are expressed in Spanish pesetas (1 euro=166 pesetas approxi-
mately).
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from among cea; p and cel. Round payo¤s were determined by the ruling
procedure.
One of our most delicate design choices was just how to construct the (mon-
etary) payo¤ functions for our experiment. In a standard experimental ses-
sion, subjects participate in a specic role-gameprotocol after which they
receive a certain amount of money as a function of how well they (and the
other subjects in the pool) have played the game. In other words, subjects
who participate in an economic experiment win money. In a real-life claims
situation, however, the claimants lose money, in the sense that they get back
less than what they have paid (or had the right to be repaid) sometime in
the past.
To some extent, the simple fact that subjects must leave the experimental
lab with more money than what they had at the time they arrived may
be considered incompatible with the possibility of running an experiment
on claim problems. To (at least partially) ameliorate this dilemma, we
constructed our monetary payo¤ functions in such a way that, in each round,
(out of a predetermined endowment, known in advance), subjects were losing
the di¤erence between their claim and the award assigned to them, given
the ruling procedure and the groups strategy prole.
More precisely, rule allocations in the experiment were constructed as
follows:
cea(c; E)  c = (7:5; 7:5; 5)  (49; 46; 5) = ( 41:5; 38:5; 0):
p(c; E)  c = (9:8; 9:2; 1)  (49; 46; 5) = ( 39:2; 36:8; 4):
cel(c; E)  c = (11:5; 8:5; 0)  (49; 46; 5) = ( 37:5; 37:5; 5):
By the same token, the payo¤ matrix associated to procedure P1, as
shown in Table 2, only contains non-positive amounts.
(2)
Table 2: Procedure P1
Table 2 is identical to the one used to explain procedure P1 to subjects.
player 1 (2) [3] selects the row (column) [matrix]. Each cell contains the
monetary payo¤s, for the three players, associated to each strategy prole.
The payo¤s were obtained as follows: From Lemma 1, if ri = cea for
some i 2 f1; 2; 3g, then the allocation is cea(c; E) c = ( 41:5; 38:5; 0).
If ri = rj for all i 6= j then the allocation is ri(c; E)   c. The al-
locations of the remaining six proles were obtained using the recursive
algorithm based on the denition of P1 that leads to (10:7; 8:4; 0:9)   c =
( 38:3; 37:6; 4:1).
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As we know from Lemma 1, every procedure provides a player (the iden-
tity of whom depends on the procedure) with a weakly dominant strategy
by which she can force her preferred outcome. In each game, we refer to
such a player as the pivotal player in that game. For P1, the pivotal player is
player 3 (the lowest claimant), whose weakly dominant strategy corresponds
to rule cea.
Analogous considerations hold for P2 and P3 whose payo¤ matrices are
drawn in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
(3)
Table 3: Procedure P2
(4)
Table 4: Procedure P3
Here we notice that p is a weakly dominant strategy in P2 for the pivotal
player 2, whereas cel is weakly dominant in P3 for the pivotal player 1.
As we can see from Tables 2-4, all situations where agentsrules do not
coincide (and no agent selects the corresponding equilibrium rule) lead to a
well-dened limit in the division of the liquidation value. In other words, the
event of no convergence (associated with a 0 payo¤ for all players), contem-
plated in the denition of all three procedures, never occurs in our games.
As it turns out, this is not a special feature of our specic parametrization
of the claim problem (c; E) -or the constraint on the set of rules or the
number of players- but rather a general property of all procedures, as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 1 For all (c; E) 2 B and for all procedures, P1; P2 and P3
with arbitrary strategy set R  R , the limit allocation x always exists.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The last procedure object of this study, the majority procedure P0, dis-
plays rather di¤erent strategic properties, as shown in Table 5.
(5)
Table 5: Procedure P0
Since this procedure yields basically a coordination game, no player has
a weakly dominant strategy. (Strict) Nash equilibria correspond to those
proles in which all players agree on the same rule.
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The payo¤s for this game were obtained as follows. If ri = rj for all
i 6= j then the allocation is ri(c; E)   c. If ri = rj 6= rk, then agents i
and j get rii(c
; E)   ci and rjj(c; E)   cj respectively whereas agent k
gets  1  ck. Finally, if all agents propose di¤erent rules, the allocation will
be ( 1; 1; 1)  c.
As we already mentioned, the payo¤s reported in Tables 2-5 were sub-
tracted from subjectsendowments. Before playing a given procedure, all
subjects received an initial endowment of 1000 pesetas in each session, from
which all losses were subtracted during the 20 rounds. At the beginning of
each following procedure, subjects would receive a new endowment of 1000
pesetas, and so on. Furthermore, subjects who were selected as players 1
and 2 received 500 pesetas as a show-up fee in the framed sessions, and 1000
pesetas in the unframed sessions. Subjects who were selected as players 3
did not receive any initial show-up fee, due to the fact that their losses were
considerably lower than the others.9 As for procedure P0, the penalty " was
equal to 1 peseta. Average earnings per hour were around 1800 pesetas (11
euros) for players 1 and 2 and around 3600 pesetas (22 euros) for player 3.
4 Experimental results
In presenting our experimental evidence, we shall look rst at procedures P1
to P3: Here we nd that, for each procedure, the corresponding equilibrium
rule emerges from the very beginning, independently on the framing condi-
tions. By stark contrast, our majority procedure P0 displays a signicantly
lower rate of equilibrium outcomes and behavior, both in framed and un-
framed sessions. Moreover, and more strikingly, convergence to equilibrium
only takes place under the proportional rule. This evidence calls for further
statistical analysis which we carry out in Section 4.3. Here we nd that, for
procedure P0, both frame and learning e¤ects are signicant in explaining
outcomes and subjectsaggregate behavior, although their relative impact
is heterogenous across players.
4.1 Procedures P1 to P3
Table 6 reports the relative frequency of allocations which correspond to
each rule for procedures P1, P2 and P3. The remaining category (labelled as
9This asymmetry in the show-up fees, meant to provide also players 1 and 2 with
the appropriate nancial gain, was communicated privately to each subject, and as such,
we shall read the data under the assumption that it played no role in determining their
decisions.
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Others) pools all allocations that do not correspond to any particular rule.
We begin by noting that virtually all matches (both in the framed and in the
unframed sessions) yielded the allocation associated with the corresponding
equilibrium rule (boldface in Table 6). We also know, from Lemma 1, that
every Nash equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the corresponding equi-
librium rule. However, there are also other strategy proles which are not
equilibria but which yield the same allocation (for example, in the case of P1
if players 1 and 3 select rule p and player 2 selects cea). In this respect, our
evidence shows that these strategy proles occur only marginally. That is to
say, if a particular rule dictates the game allocation, it is because the same
rule is supported by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding procedure.10
Procedures Framed Sessions Unframed Sessions
P1 160 :98 0 0 :02 480 1 :01 01 :03
P2 160 0 1 0 0 480 01 1 :01 0
P3 160 0 0 :98 :02 480 0 0 :99 :01
Allocations Obs. cea p cel Others Obs. cea p cel Others
(6)
Table 6: Allocation distributions of P1; P2 and P3.
We now look at subjectsaggregate behavior in Table 7. Table 7 reports
the relative frequencies with which pivotal players (player 3 in P1; player 2 in
P2 and player 1 in P3) used each strategy in the corresponding procedure. As
Table 7 shows, pivotal players overwhelmingly used their weakly dominant
strategies (relative frequencies in boldface), both in framed and unframed
sessions. This conrms that compliance with equilibrium is high in normal-
form games that are solvable in just one round with the deletion of weakly
dominated strategies (e.g., Costa-Gomes et al., 2001).11
10Relative frequencies of Nash equilibria strategy proles of (un)framed sessions of pro-
cedures P1; P2 and P3 are .98 (.94), .99 (.98) and .93 (.9) respectively. We should also
notice that, in procedures P1 and P3; a Nash equilibrium occurs if either a) the pivotal
player selects the equilibrium rule (p = 1=3 if she plays randomly) or b) in the case of her
not doing so (this, under random playing, would occur with a probability of 1 p = 2=3) if
the other two players select the equilibrium rule (probability equal to 1=9). As for P2, a
strategy prole is not a Nash equilibrium if 2 and 3 play C (which, under random playing,
would occur with a probability of 1=9) or when players 1 and 2 play A (which, under ran-
dom playing, would occur again with a probability of 1=9). The expected probability of a
Nash equilibrium under random playing is, therefore, 1=3 + 2=3  1=9 = :4: in procedures
P1 and P3 and 1   2=9 = :75 in procedure P2: This implies that relative frequencies of
equilibrium strategy proles are much higher than their predicted values under random
playing.
11As far as non-pivotal players are concerned, weakly dominant strategies are again
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Pivotal player Player 3 (P1) Player 2 (P2) Player 1 (P3)
Framed :97 :02 :01 :07 :76 :17 :02 :06 :92
Unframed :93 :03 :04 :06 :86 :08 :02 :08 :90
RULES cea p cel cea p cel cea p cel
(7)
Table 7: Aggregate behavior of pivotal players in the sessions of P1; P2 and P3.
4.2 The majority procedure P0
We now focus on P0, whose allocation distributions are reported in Table 8.
As we already anticipated, here the proportional rule is salient in describing
the allocation distributions, for both framed and unframed sessions. As Ta-
ble 8 shows, subjects not only managed to agree on an equilibrium allocation,
but they did so by way of the proportional rule (i.e., for each procedure, co-
ordination on cea or cel never exceeds 3% of total observations). Moreover,
we also observe a much higher frequency of coordinations (and therefore a
lower frequency of non-equilibrium allocations) in the framed sessions and
later periods. This is therefore indicating that both learning and frames
appear to enhance coordination (on the proportional rule).
Rounds Framed Sessions Unframed Sessions
First 10 240 0 .61 01 :38 240 :07 :24 0 :69
Last 10 240 0 :9 0 .1 240 .03 .55 :01 :42
Obs. cea p cel Others Obs. cea p cel Others
(8)
Table 8: Allocation distributions of P0.
Moving to aggregate behavior, Figure 1 shows relative frequencies of choices
in P0, for frame and unframed sessions, disaggregated for rounds and player
position. Consistently with the layout of Table 8, in Figure 1 we partition
all observations of P0 in four subsamples:
1. (F; F ) : framed sessions, rst 10 rounds;
2. (F;L) : framed sessions, last 10 rounds;
more frequently selected, although not as frequently as in the case of pivotal players (see
Herrero et al. (2003) for details).
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3. (U;F ) : unframed sessions, rst 10 rounds;
4. (U;L) : unframed sessions, last 10 rounds.
Figure 1 : Evolution of subjectsaggregate behavior in P0:
Again, we can notice from Figure 1 that subjects mainly selected the pro-
portional rule, independently of their player positions, in all sessions, and
that frequencies are higher in the framed sessions and for observations which
correspond to the last rounds of each session. We also notice that learning
e¤ects (i.e. higher propensity to choose the proportional rule in the last
rounds of each sessions) are stronger in the unframed sessions. From Figure
1 we also notice that player 2 learns lessthan what her opponents do. This
may be due to the fact that, while the proportional allocation corresponds
to the second-best choice for players 1 and 3, it is the rst best for player 2.
The learning pattern, therefore, mainly consists of players 1 and 3 gradually
discarding their rst-best rule (cel and cea for players 1 and 3 respectively),
joiningplayer 2 in the choice of their second-best option. In this respect,
our evidence is consistent with the main literature on coordination games
(see, for example, Cooper and John (1988), Cooper and Ross (1985), Van
Huyick et al. (1990a) or Van Huyick et al.. (1990b)). Moreover, also players
1 and 3 di¤er in their learning pattern. While compliance with her favorite
choice is higher for player 3 (especially in unframed sessions, where player
3 selects her favorite rule, cea; always more than 30% of the times), also
learning e¤ects are stronger (i.e. the increase in the probability of playing
strategy for player 3 is higher than that of the other two players). The
presence of strategic uncertainty, created by the multiplicity of equilibria,
yields a high variability in behavior in the rst repetitions. This variabil-
ity vanishes relatively quickly, once subjects are able to coordinate on some
equilibrium (in this case, the one supported by the proportional rule). Also
notice that in our game, unlike the literature cited above, equilibrium se-
lection cannot be due to e¢ ciencyconsiderations, since all equilibria are
equally Pareto e¢ cient.
4.3 Learning and frame e¤ects in P0
The evidence we just presented calls for further statistical analysis. In par-
ticular, we are interested in checking the extent to which frame and learning
e¤ects (basically absent in P1; P2 and P3) are signicant in explaining sub-
jectsevolution of play in our coordination procedure P0:
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Since our panel is balanced with respect to both time and frame dimen-
sions (i.e. the four subsamples contain the same number of observations),
testing for the existence of learning and frame e¤ects is equivalent to test
for homogeneity in the distributions of outcomes and behaviors in the cor-
responding subsamples. There is a caveat here. Since we deal with a panel
dataset (i.e. our observations are taken from a sequence of actions performed
by the same experimental subjects, randomly matched more than once with
other subjects belonging to the same subject pool), we have to take into
account that our four subsamples contain observations that are likely to be
statistically dependent to each other (as they refer to actions taken by the
same subject, interacting occasionally with the same subjects of her session
pool). To partially ameliorate this problem, in the statistical analysis that
follows we shall consider, for each subsample, only one (as opposed to ten)
observation, drawn at random, belonging to the same subject.12
According to the above procedure, Table 9 tests the relevance of learning
and frame e¤ects for our experimental evidence as far as outcome distribu-
tions are concerned.
H0 
2
0 p value
(F;F ) = (F;L) :137 :712
(U;F ) = (U;L) 5:6 :061
(F;F ) = (U;F ) 18:4 0
(F;L) = (U;L) 5:94 :051
(9)
Table 9
Learning and frame e¤ects in the allocation distributions of P0
Let (x;y) be the allocation distribution of (the reduced) subsample (x; y);x 2
fU;Fg ; y 2 fF;Lg : Each row of Table 9 reports the (standard) 2 test-
statistics (and the associated p value) of the corresponding null hypothesis.
In particular, the rst (last) two rows of Table 9 test for learning (frame)
e¤ects partitioning the dataset with respect to the frame (time) dimension.
As Table 9 shows, the null hypothesis (of no signicant di¤erence in out-
come distributions) is always rejected (at 10% condence level), except for
the case of learning e¤ects in the framed sessions. This conrms the evi-
dence of Figure 1 we already discussed: frame (learning) e¤ects are stronger
in earlier matches (unframed sessions).
12We thank two anonymous referees for pointing out this problem, together with useful
suggestions on how to x it.
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Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
H0 
2
0 p-val 
2
0 p-val 
2
0 p-val

(F;F )
i = 
(F;L)
i 9:6 :008 5:58 :061 9:6 :008

(U;F )
i = v
(U;L)
i 8:1 :017 5:8 :053 8:8 :012

(F;F )
i = 
(U;F )
i 6:24 :044 3:04 :218 7:15 :028

(F;L)
i = 
(U;L)
i 3:86 :145 2.51 .113 8:336 :004
(10)
Table 10
Learning and frame e¤ects in playersaggregate behavior in P0
We now move to subjectsaggregate behavior, whose corresponding sta-
tistics are reported in Table 10. By analogy with Table 9, (x;y)i denotes
player is rule distribution of P0 of (the reduced) subsample (x; y): As Table
10 shows, learning e¤ects are always signicant for all players. As for fram-
ing e¤ects, they are signicant only for player 3 (and player 2 in the rst
rounds). This conrms the evidence of Figure 1 we just discussed: player 1
(and especially player 3, whose claim is signicantly smaller than the other
two) gradually discard their favorite options to join player 2 in selecting the
proportional rule.
It is quite probable that some other factors may have inuenced the
coordination pattern. First, as we noticed above, convergence on the pro-
portional solution may have been facilitated by some sort of median voter
e¤ect, since the proportional rule is the only one in which no player receives
less than her second-best option. If this were the only e¤ect in play, we
should not expect strong framing e¤ects, since the same argument holds for
both framed and unframed treatments. However, we observe from Tables
9-10 that framing e¤ects do occur. Even if players seem sensitive to frames
to a di¤erent extent, the aggregate e¤ect (i.e. the impact on outcome dis-
tributions) is always signicant. In the conclusive remarks, we shall briey
discuss some alternative explanations that may have caused this observed
pattern in the data.
5 Taking the viewpoint of outside observers: sur-
vey results
Our previous results concerning procedure P0 strongly suggest that the pro-
portional rule shows a particular strength as a coordinating device. We have
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also observed that frames help coordination. Given that the di¤erent allo-
cation rules are often justied, in the axiomatic literature, on the grounds
of their fairness properties, we may then ask if, in our problem, a major-
ity of subjects perceived the proportional allocation as being more just or
socially appropriate than their alternatives. In other words, we might well
ask ourselves whether the proportional rule may be considered as a social
norm for solving claims problems. According to this view, the choice of the
proportional rule as a coordinating device may be interpreted as evidence of
the power of social norms to enhance coordination and cooperation within a
society [see, among others, Sugden (1986), Gauthier (1986), Skyrms (1996)
and Binmore (1998)]. In this regard, it may well be worthwhile to explore
the potential of the proportional rule as a social norm for solving problems
of adjudicating conicting claims. First, however, we must verify subjects
perception of the adequacy of the proportional rule as the best way of solving
problems of this sort under di¤erent frames, even in the absence of strategic
considerations.
To this aim, we adopted the usual approach applied for resource alloca-
tion problems, that is, we asked subjects to answer a questionnaire adopting
the perspective of an outside observer, rather than becoming involved in the
problem as a claimant. This sort of survey was inspired by the seminal
paper presented by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) and has been applied by
Bar-Hillel and Yaari (1993), Cuadras-Morató et al. (2001) and Gatcher and
Riedl (2004), among others.
More specically, we distributed 164 questionnaires among undergradu-
ate students at the University of Alicante and at the University of Málaga,
none of whom had any prior exposure to problems of adjudicating conict-
ing claims or any related issue. These students were not the same ones who
had been recruited for the experimental sessions in the lab. In the question-
naire, we proposed six di¤erent hypothetical situations leading to the same
problem (c; E) used in the experiment. Subjects were asked to select their
preferred rule (among cea; p and cel) for each individual problem in hand.
The rst three situations were those that we presented as Frames 1-3 in
Section 3.2, while the remaining three situations are described as follows.13
 Frame 4: Estate division. A person dies and leaves an estate that
is insu¢ cient to cover the claims on three legally contracted debts.
Then, E is interpreted as the estate and the claims vector c as the
debts contracted with each creditor.
13See the Appendix for a complete description of the questionnaire.
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 Frame 5: Bequests. A man dies after having promised each one
of his three sons a certain amount of money. The value of the be-
quest he leaves, however, is not su¢ cient to cover the three promised
amounts. His sons are now the claimants on the promises made to
them, individually, by their father.
 Frame 6: Taxation. The problem now consists of collecting a xed
amount of money (a tax in our case) from a given group of three
agents whose gross incomes are known to one another. As such, E
is interpreted as the amount to be collected and c as the vector of
individual (gross) incomes.
Figure 2 summarizes choice frequencies by our respondents under the six
proposed frames.
Figure 2: Questionnaire results
We rst observe from Figure 2 that the respondentschoices vary sig-
nicantly, depending on the frame. Nevertheless, the proportional rule con-
tinues to be the solution that receives the highest support in all six cases,
not only at the aggregate level (as Figure 2 shows) but also at the level of
individuals (since p represented the modal choice, across the six questions,
for 90% of responders). Furthermore, 16% of them chose the proportional
rule in all six cases, where no other rule was ever chosen, in all cases, by
any respondent. If we restrict our attention to the (minoritarian) rules cea
and cel; we observe that they are chosen with a similar rate across frames,
with a slight bias towards cel (19:2% vs. 14:8%). As for the specic frames,
cea and cel are given almost identical support under frame 1 (in which the
claimants are depositors). Rule cea is preferred against cel under frames 4
and 5 (i.e., the heritage situations), while cel is preferred in all other cases.
It is interesting the support (about 36%) received by cel under Frames 3 and
6 (i.e., non-governmental organizations and taxation). As for Frame 3; our
evidence is in keeping with the results presented by Cuadras-Morató et al.
(2001), in the context of health care problems, where cel receives a (slight)
majoritarian support. Both evidences are consistent with the idea that cel
is the appropriate solution when claims are related to needs. The support
for cel under Frame 6 (taxation), also responds to the idea of income related
to needs: people with low income should contribute relatively less, and thus,
taxation schemes should be progressive. The relatively large support of cea
under Frame 5 (34%) may be due to an interpretation of bequests more in
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line with the Spanish tradition, in which a signicant part of the estate is
distributed equally among the children.
In Table 11 we perform the same statistical analysis we carried out in
Section 4.3, to test for the impact of frames on the respondentsrule distri-
butions.
Frame 1 Frame 2 Frame 3 Frame 4 Frame 5
Frame 2
Frame 3
Frame 4
Frame 5
Frame 6
18.1 (0)
53.6 (0) 14.6 (.001)
7.42 (.02) 13.6 (.001) 32.5 (0)
37.7 (0) 54.8 (0) 60.4 (0) 21.3 (0)
34.5 (0) 5.14 (.08) 2.75 (.25) 19.1 (0) 51.7 (0)
(11)
Table 11: Testing for frame e¤ects on the surveys rule distributions
Each cell of Table 11 contains the associated 2 test-statistics (p-value within
parenthesis), where the null hypothesis is no di¤erence between the rule
distributions of the corresponding frame pairs.14 As Table 11, all pairwise
comparisons reject the null, with one sole exception, Frame 3 vs. 6, we
just discussed. This conrms our experimental evidence: frames matter and
our subjective sense of justice is sensitive to the context in which the claim
problem is posed. This consideration notwithstanding, also when facing
the problem as outside observers, the proportional rule seems salient to
characterize the most appropriate solution to the range of proposed claim
situations.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied problems of adjudicating conicting claims from
two distinct, but complementary, perspectives. As for our experimental
results, we can condently conclude that, when the rules of a procedure are
specically designed to induce a particular (equilibrium) behavior, subjects
are perfectly capable of recognizing the underlying incentive structure and
selecting the corresponding equilibrium allocation. In other words, for the
three procedures P1   P3 employed in the experiment, the Nash program is
completely successful. This claim is supported by the fact that the majority
14There is no need of discarding observations here, since we have, for each subject, one
decision per frame.
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of our subjects, commenting on how they played procedures P1   P3 in the
lab, made very similar remarks:
 In P3 everything was determined by my own choice.15
As the quote suggests, this is far more evident for pivotal players, who
can force the outcome of a game in their own favor by selecting their weakly
dominant strategy.
By stark contrast, in the majority procedure P0 coordination on the
proportional solution overwhelmingly prevails. Furthermore, in this case,
framing e¤ects signicantly enhance coordination. Similar conclusions can
be drawn from our survey results. Here again, the proportional rule is the
one that receives stronger support, both at the aggregate and at the individ-
ual levels. Again, we look at subjectscomments to nd some explanation for
such a clear-cut result, which is (only partially) consistent with the existing
experimental literature:
 At rst, I was looking for a way of maximizing my payo¤ but then
I realized that it was quite impossible to do so, as everyone else was
acting the same way and we were all losing money. So we nally
settled for an intermediate solution that was neither our best nor our
worst option.16
 I chose the option that seemed to be the most equitable one for the
three agents involved. 17
These two quotes suggest two di¤erent, but complementary, explana-
tions for the coordinating power of the proportional rule. First, this may be
due to the fact that the proportional rule tends, in general, to favor middle-
sized claimants and, therefore, to ease coordination when the rule choice is
made by majority voting (as is the case for our procedure P0).18 Nonethe-
less, this median voter e¤ect may also have been enhanced, as the second
quote suggests, by the social norm property of the proportional rule we
observe from our survey results. In this sense, subjectsmoral judgements
15Debrieng section of Session 7 (unframed). Subject # 4 (player 1).
16Debrieng section of Session 1 (framed). Subject # 9 (player 3).
17Debrieng section of Session 1 (framed). Subject # 10 (player 3).
18By a similar argument, another explanation might be related to the properties that
the proportional solution enjoys, in particular, its immunity to strategic manipulations.
In this respect, Ju et al., (2005) have shown that the proportional rule is essentially the
only rule that is immune to the manipulation via reshu­ ing, or via merging and splitting,
agentsclaims.
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may have acted as coordinating device, exactly where incentives did not pro-
vide a clear-cut solution to the coordination problem subjects were facing.19
Not surprisingly, this e¤ect is stronger in the framed sessions, where moral
considerations are easier to apply.20
To conclude, we may alert the reader that we focus on a very specic
claim problem, which may have inuenced our results in many di¤erent ways
we could not properly control for. For example, we focused on a single claim
problem (c; E) with the (non-generic) property by which the proportional
solution corresponds to the rst-best for the middle claimant and the second-
best for the others. This may have certainly enhanced the median voter
e¤ect we just mentioned. On the other hand, other classic justications,
often invoked to explain experimental evidence on coordination games, may
fall short (or their application may not be straightforward) in our case.
This is, for example, the case of the Pareto dominance criterion we already
discussed. By the same token, also risk dominance cannot directly be applied
to our context, since our games always employ more than two players and
two strategies. Moreover, if we apply the maxmin criterion as a proxy for
risk-dominance, again, we are not able to select among the three equilibria,
since out-of-equilibrium punishment does not depend on claims.
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7 Appendix 1. Proofs
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we address the convergence of procedures P1, P2 and P3 when
they are applied to arbitrary rule sets. We show that, for all of the three
procedures, whenever the process does not terminate in a nite number of
stages, then the limit case is always well dened.
7.1.1 Convergence of P1
Let (c; E) 2 B be a given problem. Let r = rj	
j2N be the prole of rules
chosen by the agents to solve the problem, where rj 2 R for all j 2 N . For
the sake of simplicity in the proof we assume that all of the chosen rules are
continuous with respect to claims.21
Fix i 2 N and consider the sequence fcki gk2N, recursively dened as
follows:
c1i = ci
ck+1i = maxj2Nfrji (ck; E)g, for all k  2.
Since rj 2 R for all j 2 N , it is straightforward to show that fcki gk2N is
weakly decreasing and bounded from below by 0. Thus, it is convergent. Let
xi = limk!1 cki and x = (xi)i2N . Thus, in taking limits in the denition of
the sequence, we would have
xi = max
j2N
f lim
k!1
rji (c
k; E)g, for all i 2 N .
Since all of the rules chosen by the agents are continuous with respect to
claims, then
xi = max
j2N
frji (x;E)g, for all i 2 N .
Note that, since c1  c2  :::  cn, it is straightforward to show that
ck1  ck2  :::  ckn for all k 2 N, and therefore x1  x2  :::  xn. Let
j0 2 N be such that x1 = maxj2Nfrj1(x;E)g = rj01 (x;E). Thus, since r 2 R,
0 = x1   rj01 (x;E)  xi   rj0i (x;E)  0, for all i 2 N .
In other words, x = rj0(x;E), which implies
P
xi = E. 
21This mild requirement is satised by all standard rules in the literature on bankruptcy.
In particular, it is satised by the three rules that we consider in our experiment.
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7.1.2 Convergence of P2
Let (c; E) 2 B be a given problem. Let r = rj	
j2N be the prole of rules
chosen by the agents for solving the problem, where rj 2 R for all j 2 N .
For all i 2 N , consider the sequences f(cki ; Ek;mki )gk2N, recursively de-
ned as follows:
(c1i ; E
1;m1i ) = (ci; E; pi(c
1;
E1
2
))
(ck+1i ; E
k+1;mk+1i ) = (c
k
i  mki ;
E
2k
; pi(c
k+1;
Ek+1
2
)), for all k  1
Now, given i 2 N and K 2 N consider PKk=1mki = PKk=1 pi(ck; Ek2 ). It is
straightforward to show that
KX
k=1
pi(c
k;
Ek
2
) = pi(c; E)  pi(cK+1; E
2K
).
Thus, since p is continuous with respect to both arguments,
1X
k=1
mki = pi(c; E)  pi( lim
K!1
cK+1; lim
K!1
E
2K
) = pi(c; E),
which proves the convergence. 
7.1.3 Convergence of P3
Let (c; E) 2 B be a given problem. Let r = rj	
j2N be the prole of rules
chosen by the agents to solve the problem, where rj 2 R for all j 2 N .
For all i 2 N , consider the sequences f(cki ; Ek;mki )gk2N, recursively de-
ned as follows:
(c1i ; E
1;m1i ) = (ci; E;min
j2N
n
rji (c
1; E1)
o
)
(ck+1i ; E
k+1;mk+1i ) = (c
k
i mki ; Ek 
X
i2N
mki ;min
j2N

rji (c
k+1;
Ek+1
2
)

), for all k  1
By denition, m11 = minj2N
n
rj1(c
1; E1)
o
. Since rj 2 R for all j 2 N ,
rj1(c
1; E1)  En . Thus, m11  En and therefore
P
i2N m
1
i  En .
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Now, it is straightforward to show that c21  c2i for all i 2 N . Then,
since rj 2 R for all j 2 N , then rjn(c2; E2)  E2n , which implies
P
i2N m
2
i 
E2
n =
E
n  
P
i2N m
1
i
n . By iterating this procedure we have the following:
E2 = E  Pi2N m1i  (1  1n)  E
E3 = E  Pi2N m2i  (1  1n)  E2  (1  1n)2  E
:::
Ek+1 = E  Pi2N mki  (1  1n)  Ek  :::  (1  1n)k  E
Thus, limk!1Ek = 0. Now, given K 2 N we have
nX
i=1
KX
k=1
mki =
KX
k=1
nX
i=1
mki = E   EK 1.
Thus,
Pn
i=1 limk!1
PK
k=1m
k
i = limk!1
Pn
i=1
PK
k=1m
k
i = E. 
7.2 The claims problem
All of the four procedures played in each of the experimental sessions were
constructed upon the same claims problem, where c = (49; 46; 5) (i.e.,P
ci = 100) and E = 20. The resulting allocations associated with each
rule for this specic problem are as follows:
cel(c; E) = (11:5; 8:5; 0);
p(c; E) = (9:8; 9:2; 1);
cea(c; E) = (7:5; 7:5; 5):
It is straightforward to show that, for every three-agent problem (c; E) 2 B
in which c1  c2  c3, we have the following:
p2(c; E) = c2  E
C
,
cel2(c; E) =
8<:
c2   C E3 if c1  E + 2c3   c2
c2 c1+E
2 if E + 2c3   c2 < c1 < E + c2
0 if c1  E + c2
,
and
cea2(c; E) =
8<:
E
3 if
E
3  c3
E c3
2 if E   2c2 < c3 < E3
c2 if c3  E   2c2
.
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As we have already mentioned earlier, the main reason for choosing the
particular problem (c; E) was to provide each claimant with a strictly
preferred allocation associated with one of the three rules. This imposes the
rst restriction on the choice of the problem:
p2(c
; E) > maxfcel2(c; E); cea2(c; E)g:
We also wanted to avoid a solution in which the two claimants with lower
claims receive nothing. This imposes our second restriction:
cel2(c
; E) > 0.
It is straightforward to show that the two restrictions, jointly, imply that
either
(cel2(c
; E); cea2(c; E)) =

c2 c1+E
2 ;
E c3
2

, or
(cel2(c
; E); cea2(c; E)) =

c2 c1+E
2 ;
E
3

.
We opted for the rst one in order to avoid ceaj = ceai for all i 6= j. All
together, it says that (c; E) must satisfy
E   2c2 < c3 <
E
3
E + 2c3   c2 < c1 < E + c2
(C   2c2)  E < c3  c
c3  E < (C   E)  (c1   c2)
It is straightforward to show that the problem presented above satises
all these inequalities.
8 Appendix 2. Instructions
8.1 Instructions for the experiments
We shall now present the instructions given for the experiments, but only
for Sessions 1 and 7. The remaining sessions go along the same lines, except
for some di¤erences that are explained in footnotes.
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8.1.1 Instructions for a Framed Session (Session 1)
Screen 1: Welcome to the Experiment
We are going to study how people interact in a bankruptcy situation. We
are only interested in knowing how the average person reacts, so no record
will be kept on how any individual subject behaves. Please do not feel that
any particular sort of behavior is expected of you.
On the other hand, keep also in mind that your behavior will a¤ect the
sum of money you may win during the course of this experiment.
On the following pages you will nd a series of instructions explaining
how the experiment works and how to use the computer during the experi-
ment.
HELP: When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button
Screen 2: How you can make money
 You will be playing two sessions of 20 rounds each. In each round
of every session, you and other two participants in this room will be
assigned to a GROUP. In each round, each person in the group has to
make a decision. Your decisions, and those decision of the other two
people in your group will determine how much money you (and the
other) win for that round.
 At the beginning of each round, the computer randomly selects the
three members of each group.
 Remember that the members of your group WILL CHANGE AT
EVERY ROUND.
 To begin, you will be given 500 pesetas each to participate in the
experiment.22 Furthermore, at the beginning of each session, an initial
endowment of 1000 pesetas will be given to you.
 Please note that the computer assigns a PLAYERS NUMBER to each
participant (1, 2 or 3). This number appears in the upper right-hand
corner of your screen and indicates the type of player you are and
will be throughout the experiment. There are three types of players,
and each group will be composed of one player of each type. Even
when your group changes, you will still continue to be the same type
of player.
22This sentence did not appear in the case of Player 3.
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 In the course of each round, you will have to pay out some money.
The amount will depend on the decisions you make as well as on the
decisions made by the other two members of group. The amount you
need to pay out during each round will be taken from your initial
endowment for that round but will be added to your TOTAL PAY-
OFF for that session. Remember that in this experiment, payo¤s
are such that, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU
ALWAYS WIN MONEY.
 At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum of
money you obtained for all of the sessions, plus the show-up fee of 500
pesetas.23
When you are quite ready to proceed, please click on the OK button.
Screen 3: The First Game (I)
Background: A bank goes bankrupt and a judge has to decide on how
the sum of money obtained from its liquidation would best be divided among
its creditors. In this rst experiment, you and all of the other participants
in the experiment are the banks creditors who have taken their claims to
court in an e¤ort to retrieve as much of it as they can.
In other words, for this session only, you, the creditors, are depositors
with accounts in the bankrupt company.24 That is to say, you are people
who have savings accounts with the bank. You now have to come to an
agreement (with the other two creditors in your group) on the percentage
of the liquidation value that should be given to each of you. Obviously, as
the bank has gone bankrupt, the sum of your claims, (i.e., the sum of your
deposits), is much higher than the liquidation funds available.
During each round, you will try to retrieve as much of your claim as pos-
sible, which, in turn, will determine your losses, (i.e., the di¤erence between
your claim and the amount you receive at the beginning of each round).
The sum of your losses will be subtracted from your initial endowments,
and what is left, will be considered to be your TOTAL payo¤ for that par-
ticular session.
23 In the case of Player 3: At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL sum
of money you were allotted in each session.
24This is the case of Frame 1. In the case of Frame 2 (3), however, the creditors are
now shareholders of the bank (non-governmental organizations that are, at least partially,
supported by the banks prots).
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Concerning the problem involving you and the other two persons in your
group, your claims and the available liquidation value, are shown in the
following table:
PLAYER CLAIM
1 49
2 46
3 5
The liquidation value is 20.
As you can clearly see, there is not enough liquidation funds available to
satisfy all of your claims.
Remember that the Players Number assigned to you (1, 2 or 3) appears
on the computer screen and will be there throughout the experiment.
From the many di¤erent options the judge has available to him with
regard to how the liquidation value should be shared out, he decides that
you, the creditors, must choose from among the following three rules:
1. RULE A: Divide the liquidation value equally among the creditors
under the condition that no one gets more than her original claim. In
other words, this rule benets the agent with the lowest claim.
2. RULE B: Divide the liquidation value proportionally, according to the
size of the claims.
3. RULE C: Losses should be divided as equal as possible among the three
creditors, subject to the condition that all agents receive something
non-negative from the liquidation value. In other words, this rule
benets the agent with the highest claim.
For the problem facing you and your group, the allocations awarded by
each of the above rules are as follows:
A  (7:5; 7:5; 5) ; B  (9:8; 9:2; 1) ; C  (11:5; 8:5; 0) :
For instance, rule B divides the liquidation value in three parts, assigning
9:8 to Player 1, 9:2 to Player 2 and 1 to Player 3.
Screen 4: The First Game (II)
The structure of this game is as follows:
Your decision, and the decisions of the members of your group will de-
termine the division of the liquidation value, as it is shown in the payo¤
34
matrices. Note that if you all agree on the same rule, then the division of
the liquidation value is exactly the one you propose.
This is how the matrices should be read: There are three tables with
nine cells each one: Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 chooses the column
and Player 3 chooses the table. Each cell contains three numbers. The rst
number is the amount of money that Player 1 will lose if that particular cell
is chosen. The second number is the amount that Player 2 loses and the
third number is how much Player 3 would lose. For further clarity, consider
the upper left cell, for example. This cell is chosen if all 3 players choose
Rule A, and division of the liquidation funds will therefore be done as Rule
A proposes, i.e., (7:5;7:5;5). As such, and taking the above claims into
account, Player 1 loses 7:5  49 =  41:5, which is the rst number in that
particular cell. Player 2, therefore, loses 7:5  46 =  38:5, and Player 3
loses 5  5 = 0 .
To summarize,
 You will be playing 20 times with ever-changing group members.
 At the beginning of each round, the computer will select the members
of your group at random;
 At the beginning of each round, you and the other two members of
your group will have to choose one of the three rules available to you
(A, B or C). Your choice (and those of the other members of your
group) will determine how much money will be subtracted from your
initial endowments, according to the corresponding table in front of
you.
To choose an option, simply click on the corresponding letter. Once you
have done so, please conrm your choice by clicking on the OK button.
Screen 5: The Second Game.
You will now play 20 rounds of the next game. In this session, just as
in the previous one, you, the creditors, are the banks depositors.25 That
is to say, people who have deposited money in accounts at the bank. As
you will notice, on your computer screen, neither the players claims nor
25This is the case of Frame 1. In the case of Frame 2 (3) the creditors are shareholders
(non-governmental organizations which are, at least, partially, supported by the bank)
rather than depositors.
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the liquidation value have changed. Just as before, you must arrive at an
agreement with the other members of your group on how the liquidation
value should be divided among you. Remember that, just as before, 1000
pesetas will be assigned to you at the beginning of the session.
The instructions for this session are almost identical to the ones for the
previous game, but with a few little modications. In each round, as before,
you must choose from among Rules A, B and C. If you all agree on the same
rule, the division of the liquidation value will be done exactly as you propose.
If only two of you agree on a rule then, those two get the share proposed
by that rule and the creditor who does not agree with the division, not only
loses her whole claim, but also pays a xed penalty of 1 peseta. Finally, if
all of you disagree on the proposed sharing, you will all lose your claims and
pay the xed penalty of 1 peseta. The allocations that correspond to each
possible situation are shown in the payo¤ matrices below.
The matrices are to be read exactly as before. If we consider the lower
left cell, for instance, this is the cell that will be selected when Players 2 and
3 choose A and Player 1 chooses C. In this particular case, player 1 loses
 1 49 =  50, which is the upper number of that particular cell. Similarly,
Player 2 loses 7:5  46 =  38:5, and Player 3 loses 5  5 = 0.
To choose an action, you simply have to click on the corresponding letter.
Once you have done so, please conrm your choice by clicking on the OK
button.
8.1.2 Instructions for an Unframed Session (Session 7)
Screen 1: Welcome to the Experiment
It is designed to study how people interact in claims situations. We are
only interested in what the average does and not how any individual subject
behaves, so no record will be kept of anyones individual behavior. Please
do not feel that any particular behavior is expected from you.
On the other hand, keep also in mind that your behavior will a¤ect the
sum of money you may win during the course of this experiment.
On the following pages you will nd a series of instructions explaining
how the experiment works and how to use the computer during the experi-
ment.
When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button
Screen 2: How you can make money
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 You will be playing four sessions of 20 rounds each. In each round, for
all sessions, you and other two persons in this room will be assigned to
a GROUP. In each round, each person in the group will have to make
a decision. Your decision (and the decision of the other two persons
in your group) will determine how much money you (and the other)
win for that round.
 At the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly select the
members of your group.
 Remember that the members of your group CHANGE AT THE END
OF EACH ROUND.
 You will receive 1000 pesetas for participating in this experiment.26
Furthermore, at the beginning of each session, an initial endowment
of 1000 pesetas will also be given to you.
 Please note that the computer assigns a PLAYERS NUMBER to each
participant (1, 2 or 3). This number appears in the upper right-hand
corner of your screen and indicates the type of player you are and
will be throughout the experiment. There are three types of players,
and each group will be composed of one player of each type. Even
when your group changes, you will still continue to be the same type
of player.
 In the course of each round, you will have to pay out some money.
The amount will depend on the decisions you make as well as on the
decisions made by the other two members of group. The amount you
need to pay out during each round will be taken from your initial
endowment for that round but will be added to your TOTAL PAY-
OFF for that session. Remember that in this experiment, payo¤s
are such that, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU
ALWAYS WIN MONEY.
 At the end of the experiment, you will receive the TOTAL sum of
money you obtained for all of the sessions, plus the show-up fee of
1000 pesetas.27
When you are ready to continue, please click on the OK button.
26This sentence was not included in the case of Player 3.
27 In the case of Player 3: At the end of the experiment you will receive the TOTAL
sum of money you were allotted in each session.
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Screen 3: The First Game.28
At the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly select the
members of your group.
During each round, you and the other two members of your group must
choose among three possible decisions: A, B and C.
Your decision, and those of the other two members of your group will
determine how much money you lose from your initial endowment in this
session, as is shown in the payo¤ matrices.
This is how the matrices should be read: There are three tables with
nine cells each: Player 1 chooses the row, Player 2 the column, and Player 3
chooses the table. Each cell contains three numbers. The rst number is the
amount of money that Player 1 will lose if that particular cell is chosen. The
second number is the amount that Player 2 loses and the third number is how
much Player 3 would lose. For further clarity, consider the lower left cell, for
example. This cell is chosen when Player 1 chooses C and Players 2 and 3
choose A. If all 3 players choose Rule A, and the division of the liquidation
funds will therefore be done as Rule A proposes, i.e., (7:5; 7:5; 5). As such,
and taking the above claims into account, Player 1 loses 41:5, which is the
rst number of that particular cell. Player 2 loses  38:5, and Player 3 loses
0.
To summarize,
 You will be playing 20 times, with ever-changing group members.
 At the beginning of each round, the computer will select the members
of your group at random;
 At the beginning of each round, you and the other two members of
your group will have to choose one of the three rules available to you
(A, B or C). Your choice (and those of the other members of your
group) will determine how much money will be subtracted from your
initial endowments, according to the corresponding table in front of
you.
To choose an action, you simply click on the corresponding letter. Once
you have done so, please conrm your choice by clicking on the OK button.
28This was the third game in Sessions 9 and 10 and the second game in Sessions 11 and
12.
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Screen 4: The Second Game.29
You will now play 20 additional rounds of the following game. The
instructions are identical to those given for the previous game, with a few
little modications. The only di¤erence is in the payo¤ matrices.
For further clarity, consider the lower left cell, for example. This cell is
chosen if Players 2 and 3 choose A and Player 1 chooses C. In this case,
Player 1 loses  39:2, which is the upper number of that particular cell.
Player 2 loses  36:8, and Player 3 loses  4.
HELP: To choose an action, you simply click on the corresponding letter.
Once you have done so, please conrm your choice by clicking on the OK
button.
Screen 5: The Third Game.30
You will now play 20 additional rounds of the following game. The
instructions are the same as for the previous game. The only di¤erence is
in the payo¤ matrices.
Consider the lower left cell, for instance. This cell is selected when
Players 2 and 3 choose A, and Player 1 chooses C. In this case, Player 1
loses  37:5, which is the upper number of that particular cell. Player 2 loses
 37:5, and Player 3 loses  5.
HELP: To choose an action, you simply click on the corresponding letter.
Once you have done so, please conrm your choice by clicking on the OK
button.
Screen 6: The Fourth Game.
You will now play 20 additional rounds of the following game. The
instructions are the same as for the previous game. The only di¤erence is
in the payo¤ matrices.
Consider the lower left cell, for instance. This cell is selected when
Players 2 and 3 choose A, and Player 1 chooses C. In this case, Player 1
loses  50, which is the upper number of that particular cell. Similarly,
Player 2 loses  38:5, and Player 3 loses 0.
HELP: To choose an action, you simply click on the corresponding letter.
Once you have done so, please conrm your choice by clicking on the OK
button.
29This was the rst game in Sessions 11 and 12.
30This was the rst game in Sessions 9 and 10.
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8.2 The questionnaire
 The rst problem
Background: A bank goes bankrupt and a judge has to decide on how the
sum of money obtained from its liquidation would best be divided among its
creditors. Obviously, as the bank has gone bankrupt, the sum of creditors
claims, (i.e., the sum of their deposits), is much higher than the liquidation
funds available. The claims and the available liquidation value, are shown
in the following table:
CREDITOR CLAIM
1 49
2 46
3 5
The liquidation value is 20.
The judge has three di¤erent options available to him with regard to how
the liquidation value should be shared out. They are the following three
rules:
1. RULE A: Divide the liquidation value equally among the three credi-
tors, on the condition that no one gets more than her original claim.
In other words, this rule benets the agent with the lowest claim.
2. RULE B: Divide the liquidation value proportionately, according to
the size of the claims.
3. RULE C: Losses should be divided as equal as possible among the
three creditors, subject to the condition that all agents receive a non-
negativeamount from the liquidation funds. In other words, this rule
benets the agent with the highest claim.
For the problem at hand, the allocations awarded by each of the above
rules are as follows:
A  (7:5; 7:5; 5) ; B  (9:8; 9:2; 1) ; C  (11:5; 8:5; 0) :
For instance, Rule B divides the liquidation value in three parts, assigning
9:8 to Creditor 1, 9:2 to Creditor 2 and 1 to Creditor 3.
What would your choice be if you were the judge?
 The second problem
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In the second problem, the claimants are all shareholders of the bank,
rather than depositors.
What would your choice be if you were the judge?
 The third problem
In the third problem, claimants are all non-governmental organizations
sponsored by the bank. Each claimant had signed a contract with the bank,
before its bankruptcy, that stated that they would receive a contribution
in accordance with their social standing (i.e., the higher their social stand-
ing, the higher the contributions they received). Thus, Doctors without
frontiers, for instance, should receive the highest endowment, Save the
children the second highest, and Friends of Real Betis Balompié the
least of all. The judge must now decide on the amounts that they should
each obtain.
What sort of distribution would you decide on if you were the judge?
 The fourth problem
A man dies leaving three debts. Let the liquidation value in the table
above be the estate that he leaves and let the claims be the debts contracted
with each creditor.
What sort of distribution would you decide on if you were the judge?
 The fth problem
In the fth problem, a man dies after having promised a certain amount
of money to each of his three sons. The value of the bequest, however, is not
enough to cover all of his promises. Thus, his sons are now the claimants
and their claims are on the promises their father had made to each of them.
What sort of distribution would you decide on if you were the judge?
 The sixth problem
In this case, the situation is di¤erent. The problem now consists of col-
lecting a certain sum of money from a group of three agents whose gross
incomes are known to one another. The amount to be collected can be in-
terpreted as a tax. More precisely, their individual incomes and the amount
to be collected are as follows:
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AGENT INCOME
1 49
2 46
3 5
The amount to be collected is 20:
For this problem, we consider three di¤erent tax schemes, which are the
following:
A  (7:5; 7:5; 5) ; B  (9:8; 9:2; 1) ; C  (11:5; 8:5; 0) :
Each one clearly states the amount that each agent must pay for the total
amount to be successfully collected. For instance, rule B forces Agent 1 to
pay 9:8, Agent 2 to pay 9:2 and Agent 3 to pay 1.
Which scheme would you choose if you were the person in charge of
levying the tax?
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levying the tax?
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A B C
A
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
B
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
C
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
A
A B C
A
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
B
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡38:3
¡37:6
¡4:1
C
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡38:3
¡37:6
¡4:1
¡38:3
¡37:6
¡4:1
B
A B C
A
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
B
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡38:3
¡37:6
¡4:1
¡38:3
¡37:6
¡4:1
C
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡38:3
¡37:6
¡4:1
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
C
Table 2: Procedure P1
A B C
A
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
B
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
C
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
A
A B C
A
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
B
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
C
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
B
A B C
A
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
B
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
C
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
C
Table 3: Procedure P2
A B C
A
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡39:6
¡36:6
¡3:7
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
B
¡39:6
¡36:6
¡3:7
¡39:6
¡36:6
¡3:7
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
C
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
A
A B C
A
¡39:6
¡36:6
¡3:7
¡39:6
¡36:6
¡3:7
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
B
¡39:6
¡36:6
¡3:7
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
C
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
B
A B C
A
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
B
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
C
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
C
Table 4: Procedure P3
A B C
A
¡41:5
¡38:5
0
¡41:5
¡47
0
¡41:5
¡47
0
B
¡50
¡38:5
0
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡6
¡50
¡47
¡6
C
¡50
¡38:5
0
¡50
¡47
¡6
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡6
A
A B C
A
¡41:5
¡38:5
¡6
¡50
¡36:8
¡4
¡50
¡47
¡6
B
¡39:2
¡47
¡4
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡4
¡39:2
¡47
¡4
C
¡50
¡47
¡6
¡50
¡36:8
¡4
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡6
B
A B C
A
¡41:5
¡38:5
¡6
¡50
¡47
¡6
¡50
¡37:5
¡5
B
¡50
¡47
¡6
¡39:2
¡36:8
¡6
¡50
¡37:5
¡5
C
¡37:5
¡47
¡5
¡37:5
¡47
¡5
¡37:5
¡37:5
¡5
C
Table 5: Procedure P0
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Figure 1: Aggregate behavior in the sessions of P0. This …gure shows the fre-
quencies of choices in P0, for each frame, and disaggregated for player position.
For instance, in Frame 1, player 1 selects p 95% of the times, whereas she selects
cel and cea only 4% and 1% of the times, respectively.
020
40
60
80
100
FRAME 1 FRAME 2 FRAME 3 FRAME 4 FRAME 5 FRAME 6
CEL
 P
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 P
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Figure 2: Results of the questionnaire. This …gure shows the histograms cor-
responding to the choices for each of the six questions/frames appearing in the
questionnaire. For instance, in Frame 1, p is selected in 86% of the responses,
whereas cea and cel are selected only in 8% and 6% of the responses, respec-
tively.
5
